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Background
Nash Equilibrium
I predict that the level of risk a player takes will be 
negatively correlated with score deficits. In other 
words, I predict that players are more willing to 
take risks when ahead and less willing to take risks 
when behind. I will construct a number of
hypothesis related to this prediction and focus on 
the extreme scoring cases such games in which the 
player is up or down by two or more points.
Lastly, I will discuss possible psychological factors 
that may explain why a player would be justified in 
changing their strategy for a given point.
For example, it is possible that the psychological 
impact of feeling ‘up’ or ‘down’ in a given game 
may have a physiological effect on the player’s 
ability to execute a risky strategy. If a player 
experiences a higher stress level when facing a 
score deficit, this could reduce the players 
coordination, strength, and focus. Factors of this 
kind could help to justify a player’s choice to 
deviate from the Nash Equilibrium and adopt a 
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Behavioral economics attempts to explain decision 
making by incorporating psychological, cultural, 
and sociological factors which are left out of the 
standard analysis.
We can use a behavioral economics analysis in 
order to predict and explain deviations from the 
Nash Equilibrium. By recognizing the 
psychological impact of being ahead or behind in 
a game, we can better understand why players 
may choose to vary their level of risk across 
scores. 
The data I will use is from the match charting data 
base compiled by Jeff Sackmann. This database 
acquires its data from the Hawk Eye system used 
to track variables such as serve speed and game 
score. This data includes point-by-point statistics 
for all major events.
I will randomly select professional matches from 
both men's and women's Grand Slam tournaments 
from which I will aggregate my data. Grand Slam 
tournaments are the highest level of tournament 
play. By limiting myself to the highest level of 
play, I will eliminate variability in serve speed 
caused by player's error.
In the game of tennis, players must make risk-
reward calculations in order to determine the 
optimal risk level for a given strategy. Low-risk 
strategies come with few unforced errors but allow 
the opponent to capitalize on weak shots. High-
risk strategies, however, minimize these 
weaknesses but lead to a greater number unforced 
errors which can offset the gains of a higher risk 
strategy. 
A match of tennis is divided into two sets which 
are composed of a number of games. In order to 
win a game, a player must win four points. In 
order to win a set, a player must win six games. 
This scoring system allows for players to be ahead 
or behind in games irrespective of the overall 
score in the match. Thus, a player can be winning 
overall in a match but experience a deficit in a 
game. This creates interesting psychological 
factors as players can feel ‘ahead’ or ‘behind’ at 
various points in the match.
From the standard game theory analysis, the 
optimal strategy should not vary across points 
within a given game. The optimal risk level should 
be the same for every game score. However, in 
practice players often noted adjusting their risk-
level dependent on their score within a game.
Nash Equilibrium: A configuration of strategies 
such that each player’s strategy is best for him, 
given those of the other players.
In an optimal strategy, players will play the Nash 
Equilibrium for all points.
Behavioral Analysis Methodology
In my study, I use first serve speed as a measure of 
risk. In tennis, players alternate games in which 
they start the points with a serve. Players are 
allowed two attempts to make a serve. The first 
serve is often an aggressive play but can be slowed 
down when necessary. The faster the serve, the 
risker the strategy. This allows for a great deal of 
variability in the risk level chosen by the player.
I will calculate the average of the first serve speed 
for each player in a given match. I will use this 
average as a baseline with which to compare serve 
speeds of individual points. I will calculate the 
difference between the average serve speed and 
that employed in specific instances in order to 
determine the variability of risky strategies across 
points. By using the difference from the average, I 
will eliminate match and player specific factors 
such as wind, time of day, fatigue, and the player’s 
skill level.
Lastly, I will check for a correlation between 
various game scores and the difference from the 
average in order to determine the effect that game 
score has on the amount of risk a player chooses to 
adopt in a given strategy.
The game scores that I am most interested in are 
the ones which are 1) the most critical and 2) have
the greatest score differential.
For this reason, I with focus scores with a point 
differential of two or more and scores where one of 
the players needs only one point to win the game. 
The most extreme examples of this are when the 
player is up 40-0 or down 0-40.
